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depend on the extent of the difference between the social and private value of consumption of illegal
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taxed with outputs and prices when the good is illegal. We show that a monetary tax on a legal good
could cause a greater reduction in output and increase in price than would optimal enforcement, even
recognizing that producers may want to go underground to try to avoid a monetary tax. This means
that fighting a war on drugs by legalizing drug use and taxing consumption may be more effective
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1. Introduction 
The effects of excise taxes on prices and outputs have been extensively 
studied. An equally large literature discusses the normative effects of these 
taxes measured by their effects on consumer and producer surplus. However, 
the emphasis has been on monetary excise taxes, while non-monetary taxes 
in the form of criminal and other punishments for illegal production of 
different goods have been discussed only a little (important exceptions are 
MacCoun and Reuter, 2001 and Miron, 2001).  
 
This paper concentrates on both the positive and normative effects of 
punishments that enforce laws to make production and consumption of 
particular goods illegal. We use the supply and demand for illegal drugs as 
our main example, a topic of considerable interest in its own right, although 
our general analysis applies to the underground economy, prostitution, 
restrictions on sales of various goods to minors, and other illegal activities.  
 
Drugs are a particularly timely example not only because they attract lots of 
attention, but also because every U.S. president since Richard Nixon has 
fought this war with police, the FBI, the CIA, the military, a federal agency 
(the DEA), and military and police forces of other nations. Despite the wide 
scope of these efforts–and major additional efforts in other nations–no 
president or drug “czar” has claimed victory, nor is a victory in sight. 
 
Why has the War on Drugs been so difficult to win? How can international 
drug traffickers command the resources to corrupt some governments, and 
thwart the extensive efforts of the most powerful nation? Why do efforts to 
reduce the supply of drugs lead to violence and greater influence for street  
  2 
gangs and drug cartels? To some extent, the answer lies in the basic theory 
of enforcement developed in this paper. 
 
Section 2 sets out a simple graphical analysis that shows how the elasticity 
of demand for an illegal good is crucial to understanding the effects of 
punishment to producers on the overall cost of supplying and consuming 
that good. Section 3 formalizes that analysis, and adds expenditures by 
illegal suppliers to avoid detection and punishment. 
 
That section also derives the optimal public expenditures on apprehension 
and conviction of illegal suppliers. The government is assumed to maximize 
a welfare function that takes account of differences between the social and 
private values of consumption of illegal goods. Optimal expenditures 
obviously depend on the extent of this difference, but they also depend 
crucially on the elasticity of demand for these goods. In particular, when 
demand is inelastic, it does not pay to enforce any prohibition unless the 
social value is negative and not merely less than the private value. 
 
Section 4 compares outputs and prices when a good is legal and taxed with 
outputs and prices when the good is illegal. It shows that a monetary tax on a 
legal good could cause a greater reduction in output and increase in price 
than would optimal enforcement, even recognizing that producers may want 
to go underground to try to avoid a monetary tax. Indeed, the optimal 
monetary tax that maximizes social welfare tends to exceed the optimal non-
monetary tax. This means, in particular, that fighting a war on drugs by 
legalizing drug use and taxing consumption may be more effective than 
continuing to prohibit the legal use of drugs.  
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Section 5 generalizes the analysis in sections 2-4 to allow producers to be 
heterogeneous with different cost functions. Since enforcement is costly, it is 
efficient to direct greater enforcement efforts toward marginal producers 
than toward infra-marginal producers. That implies greater enforcement 
against weak and small producers because marginal producers tend to be 
smaller and economically weaker. By contrast, if the purpose of a monetary 
tax partly is to raise revenue for the government, higher monetary taxes 
should be placed on infra-marginal producers because these taxes raise 
revenue without much affecting outputs and prices. 
 
Many drugs are addictive and their consumption is greatly affected by peer 
pressure.  Section 6 incorporates a few analytical implications of the 
economic theory of addiction and peer pressure.  They help explain why 
demand elasticities for some drugs may be relatively high, and why even 
altruistic parents often oppose their children’s desire to use drugs. 
 
Section 7 considers when governments should to try to discourage 
consumption of goods through advertising, like the “just say no” campaign 
against drug use. Our analysis implies that advertising campaigns can be 
useful against illegal goods that involve enforcement expenditures to 
discourage production. However, they are generally not desirable against 
legal goods when consumption is discouraged through optimal monetary 
taxes. 
  
  4 
Even though our analysis implies that monetary taxes on legal goods can be 
quite effective, drugs and many other goods are illegal. Section 8 argues that 
the explanation is related to the greater political clout of the middle classes. 
 
2. A Graphical Analysis  
We first analyze the effects of enforcement expenditures with a simple 
model of the market for illegal drugs.  The demand for drugs is assumed to 
depend on the market price of drugs that is affected by the costs imposed on 
traffickers through enforcement and punishment, such as confiscation of 
drugs and imprisonment. The demand for drugs also depends on the costs 
imposed by the government on users. 
 
Assume that drugs are supplied by a competitive drug industry with constant 
unit costs c(E) that depend on the resources, E, that governments devote to 
catching smugglers and drug suppliers.  In such a competitive market, the 
transaction price of drugs will equal unit costs, or c(E), and the full price of 
drugs Pe, to consumers will equal c(E) + T, where T measures the costs 
imposed on users through reduced convenience and/or criminal 
punishments.  Without a war on drugs, T=0 and E=0, so that Pe = c(0).  This 
free market equilibrium is illustrated in Figure 1 at point f.  
 
With a war on drugs focused on interdiction and the prosecution of drug 
traffickers, E>0 but T=0.  These efforts would raise the street price of drugs 
and reduce consumption from its free market level at f to the “war” 
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equilibrium at w, as shown in Figure 1.  
   
This figure shows that interdiction and prosecution efforts reduce 
consumption.  In particular, if D measures percentage changes, the increase 
in costs is given by Dc, and DQ = e Dc, where e < 0 is the price elasticity of 
demand for drugs. The change in expenditures on drugs from making drugs 
illegal is: 
 
DR = (1+e) Dc. 
 
When drugs are supplied in a perfectly competitive market with constant 
unit costs, drug suppliers earn zero profits. Therefore, resources devoted to 
drug production, smuggling, and distribution will equal the revenues from 
drug sales in both the free and illegal equilibria. Hence, the change in 
resources devoted to drug smuggling, including production and distribution,  
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induced by a “war” on drugs will equal the change in consumer 
expenditures.  Therefore, as eq. (1) shows, total resources devoted to 
supplying drugs will rise with a war on drugs when demand for drugs is 
inelastic (e > -1), and total resources will fall when the demand for drugs is 
elastic (e < -1).   
 
When the demand for drugs is elastic, more vigorous efforts to fight the war 
(i.e. increases in E) will reduce the total resources spent by drug traffickers 
to bring drugs to market. In contrast, and paradoxically, when demand for 
drugs is inelastic, total resources spent by drug traffickers will increase as 
the war increases in severity, and consumption falls.  With inelastic demand, 
resources are actually drawn into the drug business as enforcement reduces 
drug consumption.   
  
3.  The Elasticity of Demand and Optimal Enforcement  
This section shows how the elasticity of demand determines optimal 
enforcement to reduce the consumption of specified goods -again we use the 
example of illegal drugs. We assume that governments maximize social 
welfare that depends on the social rather than consumer evaluation of the 
utility from consuming these goods. Producers and distributors take 
privately optimal actions to avoid governmental enforcement efforts. In 
determining optimal enforcement expenditures, the government takes into 
account how avoidance activities respond to changes in enforcement 
expenditures. 
 
We use the following notation throughout this section: 
Q = consumption of drugs   
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P = price of drugs to consumers  
 
Demand: Q = D(P) 
 
F = monetary equivalent of punishment to convicted drug traffickers 
 
Production is assumed to be CRS. This is why we measure all cost variables 
per unit output. 
 
c = competitive cost of drugs without tax or enforcement, so c=c(0) from 
above 
 
A = private expenditures on avoidance of enforcement per unit output 
 
E = level of government enforcement per unit output 
 
p(E,A) = probability that a drug trafficker is caught smuggling, with  
¶p/¶E  > 0, and ¶p/¶A < 0. 
 
We assume that when smugglers are caught their drugs are confiscated and 
they are penalized F (per unit of drugs smuggled). With competition and 
CRS, price will be determined by minimum unit cost.  For given levels of E 
and A, expected unit costs are given by 
 
(2)  Expected unit cost º u = (c + A + p(E,A) F) / (1-p(E,A)). 
 
Working with the odds ratio of being caught rather than the probability 
greatly simplifies the analysis.  In particular, q(E,A) = p(E,A)/(1-p(E,A)) is 
this odds ratio, so 
 
(3)  u = (c + A) (1+q) + q F. 
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Expected unit costs are linear in the odds ratio, q, since it gives the 
probability of being caught per unit of drugs sold.  Expected unit costs are 
also linear in the penalty for being caught, F. 
 
The competitive price will be equal to the minimum level of unit cost, or 
 
(4a)  P = min (c + A) (1+q) + qF. 
                   A 
 
The FOC for cost minimization (with respect to A), taking E and F as given, 
is 
 
(5)  - ¶q/¶A (c + A + F) = (1 + q). 
 
 
We interpret expenditures on avoidance, A, as including the entire increase 
in direct costs from operating an illegal enterprise.  This would include costs 
from not being able to use the court system to enforce contracts, and costs 
associated with using less efficient methods of production, transportation, 
and distribution that have the advantage of being less easily monitored by 
the government.  The competitive price will exceed the costs under a legal 
environment due to these avoidance costs, A, the loss of drugs due to 
confiscation, and penalties imposed on those caught.  
 
Hence, the competitive price will equal the minimum expected unit costs, 
given from eq. (4a) as  
 
(4b)  P*(E) = (c + A*) (1+q(E, A*)) + q(E, A*) F,  
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where A* is the cost minimizing level of expenditures.  The competitive 
equilibrium price, given by this equation, exceeds the competitive 
equilibrium legal price, c, by A (the added cost of underground production); 
(c+A)q, the expected value of the drugs confiscated; and qF, the expected 
costs of punishment. 
 
An increase in punishment to drug offenders, F, raises the cost and lowers 
the profits of an individual drug producer. The second order condition for 
A* in eq. (5) to be a maximum implies that avoidance expenditures increase 
as F increases. But in competitive equilibrium, a higher F has no effect on 
expected profits because market price rises by the increase in expected costs 
due to the higher punishment. In fact, those drug producers and smugglers 
who manage to avoid apprehension make greater realized profits when 
punishment increases because the increase in market price exceeds the 
increase in their unit avoidance costs. 
 
The greater profits of producers who avoid punishment, and even the 
absence of any effect on expected profits of all producers, does not mean 
that greater punishment has no desired effects. For the higher market price, 
given by eq. (4), induced by the increase in punishment reduces the use of 
drugs. The magnitude of this effect on consumption depends on the elasticity 
of demand: the more inelastic is demand, the smaller is this effect. 
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The role of the elasticity and the effect on consumption is seen explicitly by 
calculating the effect of greater enforcement expenditures on the equilibrium 
price.  In particular, by the envelope theorem, we have
1 
 
(6a)  dP/dE = ¶q/¶E (c + A* + F) > 0, and hence 
 
(6b)  dlnP/dlnE = eq q (c + A* + F)/P =  eq [q(c+A*+F)/P] = eq l 
 
 
Here, l = q(c+ A*+ F)/P < 1, and eq is the elasticity of the odds ratio, q, with 
respect to E. Again denoting the elasticity of demand for drugs by ed, eq. 
(6b) implies that 
 
(7)  dlnQ/dlnE = ed dlnP/dlnE = ed eq l < 0.   
 
If enforcement is a pure public good, then the costs of enforcement to the 
government will be independent of the level of drug activity (i.e. C(E,Q) 
=C(E)). On the other hand, if enforcement is a purely private good (with 
respect to drugs smuggled), an assumption of CRS in production implies that 
C(E,Q) = QC(E). We adopt a mixture of these two formulations.  In addition 
to these costs, the government has additional costs from punishing those 
caught. We assume that punishment costs are linear in the number caught 
                                           
1 Differentiate  eq. 4a) with respect to E and note that in general the optimal value of A will vary as E 
varies: 
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From the first order condition for A, the sum of the terms inside the brackets on the right hand side of the 
equation for dP/dE is zero. 
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and punished (qQ).  With a linear combination of all the enforcement cost 
components,  
 
(8)  C(Q,E,q) = C1E + C2QE + C3qQ. 
 
Eq. (8) implies that enforcement costs are linear in the level of enforcement 
activities, although they could be convex in E without changing the basic 
results. Enforcement costs also depend on the level of drug activity (Q), and 
the fraction of drug smugglers punished (through q).  
 
The equilibrium level of enforcement depends on the government’s 
objective. We assume that the government wants to reduce the consumption 
of goods like drugs relative to what they would be in a competitive market.  
We do not model the source of these preferences, but assume a “social 
planner” who may value drug consumption by less than the private 
willingness to pay of drug users, measured by the price, P. If V(Q) is the 
social value function, then ¶V/¶Q º Vq ￿ P, with Vq strictly < P if there is a 
perceived externality from drug consumption, and hence drug consumption 
is socially valued at strictly less than the private willingness to pay.  When 
Vq < 0, the negative externality from consumption exceeds the positive 
utility to consumers. 
 
With these preferences, the government chooses E to maximize the value of 
consumption minus the sum of production and enforcement costs.  Thus it 
chooses E to solve 
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(9)  max W =  V(Q(E)) – u(E)Q(E) – C(Q(E), E, q(E, A*(E)).  
    E 
 
The government incorporates into its decision the privately optimal change 
in avoidance costs by drug producers and smugglers to any increase in 
enforcement costs. With the assumption of CRS on the production side, then 
u(E)Q(E) = P(E)Q(E), and we assume C is given by eq. (8).  Thus the 
planner’s problem simplifies to 
 
 
(10)  max W =  V(Q(E)) – P(E) Q(E) – C1E – C2Q(E)E – C3q(E, A*(E))Q(E) 
      E  
 
 
The first order condition is 
 

























(12a)  C1 + C2 (Q + EdQ/dE) + C3 (q dQ/dE + Q dq/dE) = Vq dQ/dE – MR dQ/dE, 
where MR º d(PQ)/dQ denotes marginal revenue. 
 
The left hand side of eq. (12a) is the marginal cost of enforcement, including 
the effects on output and the odds ratio. The right hand side is the marginal 
benefit of the reduction in consumption, including the effect on production 
costs. This equation becomes more revealing if we temporarily assume that  
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marginal enforcement costs are zero. Then the RHS of this equation equals 
zero, which simplifies to 
 
12b) Vq = MR º P(1+1/ed), or Vq/P = 1+1/ed,  
 
and Vq/P is the ratio of the social  marginal willingness to pay to the private 
marginal willingness to pay of drug users (measured by price). 
  
If Vq ￿ 0, so that drug consumption has non-negative marginal social value, 
and if demand is inelastic, so that MR < 0, eq. (12b) implies that optimal 
enforcement would be zero, and free market consumption would be the 
social equilibrium. There is a loss in social utility from reduced consumption 
since the social value of additional consumption is positive - even if it is less 
than the private value–while production and distribution costs increase as 
output falls when demand is inelastic.   
 
The conclusion that with positive marginal social willingness to pay-no 
matter how small-inelastic demand, and punishment to traffickers, the 
optimal social decision would be to leave the free market output unchanged 
does not assume the government is inefficient, or that enforcement of these 
taxes is costly. Indeed, the conclusion holds in the case we just discussed 
where governments are assumed to catch violators easily and with no cost to 
themselves, but costs to traffickers. Costs imposed on suppliers bring about 
the higher price required to reduce consumption. But since marginal revenue 
is negative when demand is inelastic, total costs would rise along with 
revenue as price rises and output is reduced, while total social value would  
  14
fall as output falls if Vq were positive. The optimal social decision is clearly 
then to do nothing, even if consumption imposes significant external costs 
on others.  
 
This result differs radically from well-known optimal taxation results with 
monetary taxes. Then, if the monetary tax is costless to implement, and  
if the marginal social value of consumption is less than price–no matter how 
small the difference–it is always optimal to reduce output below its free 
market level.  
 
Even if demand is elastic, it may not be socially optimal to reduced output if 
consumption of the good has positive marginal social value. For example, if 
the elasticity is as high as –11/2, eq. (12b) shows that it is still optimal to do 
nothing as long as the ratio of the marginal social to the marginal private 
value of additional consumption exceeds 1/3. It takes very low social values 
of consumption, or very high demand elasticities, to justify intervention, 
even with negligible enforcement costs. 
 
Intervention is more likely to be justified when Vq < 0: when the negative 
external effects of consumption exceed the private willingness to pay. If 
demand is inelastic, marginal revenue is also negative, and eq. (12b) shows 
that a necessary condition to intervene in this market is that marginal social 
value be less than marginal revenue at the free market output level.  
There are no reliable estimates of the price elasticity of demand for illegal 
drugs, mainly because data on prices and quantities consumed of illegal 
goods are scarce. However, estimates generally indicate an elasticity of less 
than one in absolute value, although  one or two studies estimate a larger  
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elasticity (see Caulkins, 1995, van Ours, 1995).  Moreover, few studies of 
drugs have utilized the theory of rational addiction, which implies that long 
run elasticities exceed short run elasticities for addictive goods (see section 
6).
2 Since considerable resources are spent fighting the war on drugs and 
reducing consumption, the drug war can only be considered socially optimal 
with a long run demand elasticity of about –1/2 if the negative social 
externality of drug use is more than twice the positive value to drug users. 
Of course, perhaps the true elasticity is much higher, or the war may be 
based on interest group power rather than maximizing social welfare (see 
section 8). 
 
Punishment to reduce consumption is easier to justify when demand is 
elastic and hence marginal revenue is positive. If enforcement costs continue 
to be ignored, total costs of production and distribution must then fall as 
output is reduced. If Vq < 0, social welfare would be maximized by 
eliminating consumption of that good because costs decline and social value 
rises as output falls. However, even with elastic demand and negative 
marginal social value, rising enforcement costs as output falls could lead to 
an internal equilibrium. 
  
Figure 2 illustrates another case where it may be optimal to eliminate 
consumption (ignoring enforcement costs). In this case, demand is assumed 
                                           
2 Grossman and Chaloupka (1998) present a variety of  estimates of rational addiction models of the demand for 
cocaine by young adults in panel data.  They emphasize an estimate of the long-run price elasticity of total 
consumption (participation multiplied by frequency given participation) of -1.35.  When, however, they 
include individual fixed effects to control for unmeasured area-specific effects that may be correlated with 
price and consumption, the elasticity becomes -0.67.  One problem with the latter estimate is that biases 
due to random measurement error in the price of cocaine are exacerbated in the fixed-effects specification.  
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to be elastic, and at the free market equilibrium, Vq is positive and greater 
than MR, but it is less than the free market price. MR is assumed to rise 
more rapidly than Vq does as output falls, so that they intersect at Qu. That 







The optimum in this case is to go to one of the corners, and either do nothing 
and remain with the free market output, or fight the war hard enough to 
eliminate consumption. Which of these extremes is better depends on a 
comparison of the area between Vq and MR to the left of Qu, with the 
corresponding area to the right. If the latter is bigger, output remains at the 
free market level, even if the social value of consumption at that point were 
much less than its private value. It would be optimal to remain at the free  
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market output when reducing output from the free market level lowers social 
value by sufficiently more than it lowers production costs. 
 
Eq. (12a) incorporates enforcement costs into the first order conditions for a 
social maximum. It is interesting that marginal enforcement costs also 
depend on the elasticity of demand, and they too are greater when demand is 
more inelastic.  To see this, rewrite the LHS of eq. (12a) as 
 
 
  MCE           = C1 + C2Q + C2EdQ/dE + C3(q dQ/dE + Qdq/dE)  
 
= C1 + C2Q (1 + dlnQ/dlnE) + C3(qdQ/dE + Qdq/dE)  
 
= C1 + C2Q (1 + dlnQ/dlnE) + C3q Q/E(dlnQ/dlnE + eq*) 
 
(13)    = C1 + C2Q (1 + l eq ed) + C3qQ/E eq* (1 + l ed eq/eq*). 
 
Here eq* is the total elasticity of q with respect to E, which includes the 
indirect effect of E on the privately optimal changes in avoidance costs, A, 
by producers and distributors.  That is, since 
 
  dq/dE = ¶q/¶E + (¶q/¶A)(dA/dE) ￿ eq* = eq + eA dlnA/dlnE. 
Eq. (13) shows that marginal enforcement costs are greater, the smaller is ed 
in absolute value because consumption falls more rapidly as enforcement 
increases when demand is more elastic.  Since expenditures on apprehension 
and punishment depend on output, a slower fall in output with more inelastic  
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demand causes enforcement expenditures to grow more rapidly.  Indeed, 
eq.(13) implies that if demand is sufficiently elastic, marginal enforcement 
costs can be negative when enforcement increases since the drop in the scale 
of production can more than offset the increased cost per unit. 
 
So the elasticity of demand is key on both the cost and benefit sides of 
enforcement.  When demand is elastic, total industry costs fall as 
consumption is reduced, and enforcement costs increase more slowly, or 
they may even fall. Extensive government intervention in this market to 
reduce output would then be attractive if the marginal social value of 
consumption is low. In contrast, when demand is inelastic, total production 
costs rise as consumption falls, and enforcement costs rise more rapidly. 
With inelastic demand, a war to reduce consumption would be justified only 
when marginal social value is very negative. Even then, such a war will 
absorb a lot of resources. 
 
4.  A Comparison with Monetary Taxes 
It is instructive to compare these results for enforcement effects with well-
known results for monetary taxes on legal goods. The social welfare 
function for these monetary taxes that corresponds to the welfare function 
for enforcement of the prohibition against drugs in eq. 9 is, ignoring 
avoidance and enforcement costs, 
 
(14a)  Wm = V(Q) – cQ  – (1- d)tQ,  
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where t is the  monetary tax per unit output of drugs, and d gives the value 
to society per each dollar taxed away from taxpayers. Since in competitive 
equilibrium P = c +t,  eq. (14a) can be rewritten as 
 
(14b) Wm = V(Q) - cQ - (1 - d)(P(Q)Q - cQ) 
 
The first order condition for Q is 
 










￿  ￿ 
￿ 
￿ 
￿  ￿   
 
If tax receipts are a pure transfer, so that d=1, eq. (15a) or (15b) gives the 
classical result that the optimal monetary tax equals the difference between 
marginal private (measured by P) and marginal social value. With a pure 
transfer, the elasticity of demand is irrelevant. The optimal monetary tax is 
positive if the marginal social value of consumption at the free market 
competitive position is less than the competitive price. 
 
The elasticity of demand becomes relevant if there are net social costs or 
benefits from the transfer of resources to the government. If government tax 
receipts are socially valued at less than dollar for dollar (d<1), and if demand 
is inelastic (ed > -1), the optimal tax would be positive only if the marginal  
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social value of consumption were sufficiently less than the marginal private 
value. The converse holds if tax revenue is highly valued so that d >1.  The 
optimal tax on this good might then be positive, even if demand is inelastic 
and social value exceeds private value.  
 
Of course, if the monetary tax gets too high, some drug producers might try 
to avoid the tax by trafficking in the underground economy.  An optimal 
monetary tax on a legal good is still always better than optimal enforcement 
against an illegal good. The proof assumes that the government can choose 
optimal punishments for producers who sell in the underground economy, 
and that demand for the good is not reduced by making the good illegal.  
Let E* denote the optimal value of enforcement that maximizes the 
government’s welfare function given by eq. (10), and recall that this optimal 
value takes account  of avoidance expenditures by producers. Then, from  
eq. (4b), the optimal price is P* = (c + A*)(1 + q(E*, A*)) + q(E*, A*)F.   
 
Assume that enforcement against drug producers who try to avoid the 
monetary tax by selling in the underground economy is sufficient to raise the 
unit costs of these producers to the same  P*.  If the monetary tax is then set 
at slightly less than t*=P* – c, firms that produce in the legal sector will be 
slightly more profitable than illegal underground firms. The latter would be 
driven out of business, or become legal producers. Even ignoring the 
revenue from the monetary tax, enforcement costs would then be lower with 
this monetary tax than with optimal enforcement since few would produce 
illegally.  Indeed, in this case, governments only have to incur the fixed  
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component of enforcement costs, C1 E*, since in equilibrium no one 
produces underground. 
 
The government could even enforce an optimal monetary tax that raises 
market price above the price with optimal enforcement when drugs are 
illegal. This is sometimes denied with the argument that producers would go 
underground if monetary taxes are too high. But the logic of the analysis 
above on deterring underground production shows that this claim is not 
correct. Whatever the level of the optimal monetary tax, it could be enforced 
by raising punishment and apprehension sufficiently to make the  net price 
to producers in the illegal sector below the legal price with the optimal 
monetary tax. Since no one would then produce in the illegal sector, actual 
enforcement expenditures would be limited to the fixed component, C1 E*. 
 
To be sure, the optimal monetary tax would depend on this fixed component 
of enforcement expenditures. But perhaps the most important implication of 
this analysis relates to a comparison of optimal monetary taxes and 
enforcement against illegal goods. If enforcement costs are ignored, and if  
d > 0, a comparison of the FOC’s in eqs. (12b) and (15a) clearly shows that 
the optimal monetary tax would exceed the optimal “tax” due to 
enforcement and punishment if demand were inelastic since marginal 
revenue is then always less than c, unit legal costs of production. The 
incorporation of enforcement costs only reinforces this conclusion about a 
higher monetary tax since enforcement costs of cutting illegal output are 
greater when all production is illegal rather than when some producers go 
underground to avoid monetary taxes. 
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If d=1 and there are no costs of enforcing the optimal monetary tax, optimal 
output (Qf) satisfies Vq = c (see eq. (15a)).  When some enforcement costs 
must be incurred to insure that no one produces underground, optimal output 
(Q*) satisfies 
 
16)  (Vq - c)dQ/dE = C1. 
 
Since an increase in E lowers Q, Vq must be less than c.  That implies that Q* 
exceeds Qf.  Note that optimal legal output is zero when Vq is negative, and 
there are no enforcement costs.  But eq. (16) could be satisfied at a positive 
output level when Vq is negative as long as dQ/dE is sufficiently negative at 
that output. 
 
Various wars on drugs have been only partially effective in cutting drug use, 
but the social cost has been large in terms of resources spent, corruption of 
officials, and imprisonment of many producers, distributors, and drug users. 
Even some individuals who are not libertarians have called for 
decriminalization and legalization of drugs because they believe the gain 
from these wars has not been worth these costs. Others prefer less radical 
solutions, including decriminalization only of milder drugs, such as 
marijuana, while preserving the war on more powerful and more addictive 
substances, such as cocaine. 
 
Our analysis shows, moreover, that using a monetary tax to discourage legal 
drug production could reduce drug consumption by more than even an 
efficient war on drugs. The market price of legal drugs with a monetary 
excise tax could be greater than the price induced by an optimal war on  
  23
drugs, even when producers could ignore the monetary tax and consider 
producing in the underground economy.  Indeed, the optimal monetary tax 
would exceed the optimal price due to a war on drugs if the demand for 
drugs is inelastic- as it appears to be- and if the demand function is 
unaffected by whether drugs are legal or not- the evidence on this is not 
clear. With these assumptions, the level of consumption that maximizes 
social welfare would be smaller if drugs were legalized and taxed optimally 
instead of the present policy of trying to enforce a ban on drugs. 
 
5.  Heterogeneous Taxes and Suppliers 
The assumptions made so far of identical firms and of a constant 
enforcement tax per unit of output has brought out important principles that 
mainly continue to hold more generally. This section deals briefly with a few 
novel aspects of optimal enforcement when producers have different costs. 
 
The US experience with the prohibition of alcoholic beverages shows that 
most companies which produced the good when it was legal exited the 
industry after prohibition. Legal producers of beer and other alcoholic 
beverages were replaced by companies who were more willing to, and more 
skilled at, delivering beer and liquor to underground illegal retailers, while 
evading or bribing the police and courts that enforced prohibition. More 
generally, suppliers of illegal goods would generally differ from those who 
would produce and sell the goods when they were illegal. 
Presumably, illegal firms would have higher production costs under the 
contractual and other aspects of the legal and economic environment when 
production is legal than the firms that produced the goods when they were  
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legal. Otherwise, producers under prohibition would have been the low cost 
producers, and they would have dominated the legal industry.  
 
By limiting the firms that want to enter, prohibition of a good is likely to 
lower the elasticity of supply. If the elasticity were less than infinite because 
some firms are relatively low cost producers in an illegal environment, the 
government should be more active in its enforcement against marginal 
producers and marginal outputs. Any real expenditures on more efficient 
infra-marginal producers and infra-marginal units is a waste and serves no 
efficiency purpose.  
 
With heavier enforcement against marginal producers, the change in 
producer costs is less than the change in consumer expenditures as the 
equilibrium price is forced up by enforcement activities. Social costs would 
then be measured by the smaller rise in producer costs, not by the larger rise 
in consumer expenditures, as long as the increase in producer rents or profits 
are considered a transfer from consumers to producers, and not a social cost 
of the reduction in consumption.  However, if no social value were placed on 
these profits–such as profits to a drug cartel–social cost would still be 
measured by consumer expenditures, and it would not then be possible to 
reduce social costs by enforcing more intensively against marginal producers 
than against more efficient producers. 
 
Of course, to go after marginal producers more heavily requires information 
on the costs of different producers in an illegal environment.  Although the 
direct information on such costs may be limited, indirect evidence may be 
considerable since marginal firms tend to be smaller, younger, less  
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profitable, and financially weaker. It would then be optimal to impose higher 
unit taxes on smaller, younger, and weaker suppliers. Weaker enforcement 
against larger producers of drugs is often taken as evidence that these 
producers bribed and corrupted police and other officials–which may be 
true.  At the same time, our analysis shows that such weaker enforcement 
may be socially optimal. Government policy should recognize that heavy 
enforcement against larger and more efficient producers is a wasteful way to 
raise price and reduce consumption of drugs. 
 
Note the contrast with well-known results on optimal monetary taxation of 
heterogeneous producers. If tax revenue is highly valued, higher monetary 
taxes should be extracted from infra-marginal producers than from marginal 
producers because more efficient producers collect profits that can be taxed 
away without adverse effects on their incentives. In the extreme case of 
completely inelastic supply, monetary taxes have no effects on incentives or 
output, and produce abundant tax revenue. 
 
6.  Addictions and Peer Pressure 
Some drugs are highly addictive, although the degree of addiction of many 
of them is controversial. Most drug users start in their teens or early 
twenties, and peer pressure is especially strong among teenagers (see e.g., 
Coleman, 1961). This is why it is important to integrate both peer pressure 
and addiction into an analysis of the positive and normative aspects of illegal 
markets for drugs. 
 
The combination of addiction to a good and peer pressure to consume that 
good may lower the short run elasticity of demand for drugs, but they raise  
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its long-run response to price and other shocks that are common to different 
consumers.  These forces may raise the long run elasticity of demand for 
drugs to sizeable level, although not necessarily greater than one. For 
example, essentially all estimates of the long run demand elasticity are less 
than one for a highly addictive good like smoking, which is apparently also 
greatly affected by peer pressure. 
 
Some models of addiction imply that individuals consume greater quantities 
of addictive goods than they “really” would like to. The usual claim is that 
multiple inconsistent selves battle for control over an individual’s decision-
making process, such as when they use hyperbolic discounting of future 
utilities. The implications for optimal excise taxes of these models are 
generally not unique to harmful addictive goods, and apply to the 
consumption of all goods that trade off present utility for future disutility.  If 
these approaches are correct, they would provide additional reasons why the 
utility from the social consumption of harmful addictive goods is below 
private utilities. 
 
Even if increased consumption of a good by members of a peer group lowers 
the utility of other members, that could stimulate greater consumption of this 
good by all other members through raising the good’s marginal utility to 
these members. In this case, goods that are sensitive to peer pressure, such as 
drugs, would be consumed excessively from the viewpoint of members of 
the peer group as well. This would be a further reason why the social value 
of the consumption of drugs was below the private values of individuals.  Of 
course, if greater consumption by peers  raised rather than lowered utilities  
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of other members, social utility would exceed private utilities due to the 
effects of peer pressure. 
 
If parents believe their children use drugs because of the negative influence 
of peer pressure, this analysis provides one reason why even altruistic 
parents try to reduce drug use by their children.  Promoting effective 
reductions in drug use by making drugs illegal or placing a high excise tax 
on drugs would then raise the utilities of their children and other members of 
the peer group.  Also, altruistic parents may be concerned about their 
children consuming addictive goods that lower the children’s future utilities 
because altruistic parents may be “forced” to help them out in the future 
when the children’s utilities are lower. 
 
7.  Just Say No 
Monetary excise tax theory leaves little room for government policies to 
reduce the demand function for goods that are taxed. If the purpose is to 
raise revenue, why try to reduce demand that reduces tax revenue? In 
addition, it is more efficient to cut consumption because of an externality 
with optimal monetary taxes that also raise revenue than with costly 
programs that reduce the demand function. 
 
These advantages do not apply to illegal goods with enforcement and 
punishment costs. These expenditures could be reduced by successful 
government efforts to discourage consumption of these goods.  The 




Illegal goods like drugs have two classes of policy instruments: enforcement 
and punishment strategies that reduce consumption by raising the real costs 
and prices of supplying the goods, and expenditures on “education,” 
“advertising,” and “ persuasion” that reduce demand for these goods. If ￿ 
represents these expenditures, the social value function W in eq. (10) would 
be modified to 
 
W= V(Q(E, ￿), ￿) - P(E)Q(E, p) - c(￿). 
 
In this equation,  c(￿) is the cost of producing ￿ units of persuasion against 
consuming Q, and for simplicity we ignore enforcement costs (C). We allow 
W to depend directly on ￿ as well as indirectly through ￿’s effect on Q.  
 
The FOC for maximizing W with respect to ￿ is 
 
(18)     - Qp(P - Vq) +Vp = cp, 
 
where a subscript denotes a partial derivative. 
 
The term on the RHS of this equation, cp > 0, gives the marginal cost of 
producing ￿, and the LHS gives the marginal benefit of additional ￿. If 
persuasion is effective in reducing consumption then Qp < 0.  Reduction in 
consumption is desirable if the marginal social value of consumption, Vq, is 
less than its private value, measured by P.  The sign of the term V￿ is 
positive or negative as society likes or dislikes the “persuasion”. However,  
  29
persuasion can have social value even if it is disliked because the LHS of eq. 
(18) can be positive, even if V￿ < 0, if Vq is sufficiently less than P. 
 
What is interesting about the FOC for persuasive activities to reduce demand 
is that these activities may be effective in raising social welfare when 
enforcement activities are least effective. We have shown that it is socially 
optimal not to spend resources to reduce consumption of an illegal good if 
its demand is inelastic, and if the marginal social value of its output is 
positive (Vq >0). 
 
Eq. (18) shows, however, that the elasticity of demand has no effect on the 
effectiveness of persuasive activities to reduce consumption of an illegal 
good.  Therefore, even if demand is inelastic, and even if the marginal social 
value of its consumption were positive, there still could be a strong case for 
persuasive efforts to reduce consumption of an illegal good. This depends on 
whether Vq < P, or whether marginal social value is less than private value. 
If it is less, persuasion would raise social welfare if it is cheap to produce, 
and if persuasion efforts do not have a large negative social value. Note that 
Vq < P is the same criterion that determines whether monetary taxes are 
desirable. 
 
Persuasion may also raise the effectiveness of enforcement expenditures by 
raising the elasticity of demand. Becker and Murphy (1992) show that 
advertising tends to raise the elasticity of demand because it tries to target 
marginal consumers and increase their demands. It is more efficient for 
governments to  try to reduce the demand for illegal goods of marginal 
consumers than of other consumers since the former are easier to affect  
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because they get little surplus from consuming these goods. This means that 
persuasion does not have to reduce their willingness to pay by a lot to 
discourage them from consuming these goods. Persuasion could be an 
effective instrument of government policy not only by reducing demand for 
illegal goods, but also by raising the effectiveness of enforcement through 
raising the elasticity of demand for these goods. 
 
8.  Why Are Goods Illegal Rather Than Legal And Taxed? 
We demonstrated that if the social value of a good is less than its private 
value, it would be most effective to allow the good to be legal, and impose 
the right monetary tax to account for the discrepancy between private and 
social values.  Yet throughout history goods like drugs, prostitution, and 
gambling have frequently been illegal.  One answer to this discrepancy 
between actual and optimal policies depends on their different impacts on 
the consumption of middle class and poorer persons.  Higher and middle 
level income families often prefer certain goods to be illegal rather than 
taxed, while poorer persons prefer the opposite.  If the poor have much less 
political power, these goods would end up being illegal. 
 
Even if the increase in money price were the same when a good was illegal 
and when it was legal and taxed, the consumption of richer and poorer 
consumers would be affected differently. Suppose a monetary tax raises the 
price of a good by DP to all consumers, and that appropriate enforcement 
policies prevented a black market in the good.  This price increase will tend 
to have different income and substitution effects to members of different 
income groups. Even if preferences did not differ by income class, the poor 
would be more affected by a monetary price increase when the income  
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elasticity of demand is less than one, and when the value of the time spent 
consuming the good is a relatively large part of the total cost of 
consumption.  Estimated income elasticities for cocaine, marijuana, and 
heroin are generally much less than one (see Grossman and Chaloupka, 
1998, Liccardo Pacula, Grossman, Chaloupka, O' Malley, Johnston, and 
Farrelly, 2000, and Saffer and Chaloupka, 1999. However, van Ours, 1995, 
finds a high income elasticity for opium in the Dutch West Indies). 
 
Up to a point the income and substitution effects work in the same way 
when the street price of drugs rises because it is illegal.  However there is 
price discrimination when goods are illegal because the total price of illegal 
goods tends to be lower to poorer persons.  Since most crimes are 
concentrated in poorer neighborhoods, illegal drug production and 
distribution also tends to be concentrated in these neighborhoods. This 
makes illegal goods cheaper to persons who live in these neighborhoods 
since access to them is easier. The total cost of drugs and other illegal goods 
is cheaper to poorer persons also because they are more likely to be involved 
in the trafficking in these goods.  They are more involved because the cost of 
imprisonment and similar punishments from selling drugs is less to 
individuals with lower opportunities in the legal sector. The full cost 
argument is stronger if we consider enforcement against consumers.  Since 
the non-monetary tax, i.e., punishment, is more time intensive, this 
corresponds to a difference in the value of the tax between classes that 
exacerbates the effect.  There are also reputational effects that make 
conviction costlier for the wealthy.  In fact, more than half of all persons 
imprisoned on drug charges are African-American (see Maguire and Pastore, 
2001, and Harrison and Beck, 2003).  
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Even disclosure of use sometimes is very costly to higher income and more 
educated persons.  During his first presidential campaign, Bill Clinton had to 
deny that he inhaled on the allegedly few occasions when he smoked 
marijuana. Marijuana use during his student days cost Judge Douglas 
Ginsberg a Supreme Court seat. 
 
Our conclusion is that making goods illegal and punishing suppliers and 
consumers by imprisonment and other methods are more costly to higher 
income persons, and hence tends to reduce their consumption more than 
consumption of lower income persons.  Even if low, middle, and higher 
income parents have the same desire to discourage drug use by their 
children, the great political influence of higher education and income groups 
would explain why drugs are illegal rather than subject to sizeable monetary 
excise taxes. It also helps explain why punishment is mainly imposed on 
suppliers rather than consumers of drugs since traffickers are more likely 
than consumers to be low-income persons. 
 
This analysis also helps explain why prostitution and much gambling are 
illegal rather than legally consumed with high excise taxes. If individuals at 
all income levels want to discourage consumption of these goods by children 
and other family members or friends, the politically powerful middle and 
higher income persons would prefer to make them illegal rather than legal 
and subject to high “sin” taxes. The explanation is again that consumption of 
these goods by middle and richer individuals are reduced more when they 
are illegal than subject to the high sin taxes. The intent may not be to inflict 
greater harm on the poor, but making goods like drugs, gambling, and  
  33




Our research has been supported by The Robert Wood Johnson Foundation 
(Grant I.D. # 045566 to the National Opinion Research Center), the Hoover 
Institution Project on Drugs, and the Stigler Center for the Study of the 
Economy and the State.  Helpful comments were received from Steve Levitt 
and Ivan Werning, and at seminars at The University of Chicago and 
Harvard University.  Steve Cicala provided excellent research assistance.  
This paper has not undergone the review accorded official National Bureau 
of Economic Research publications; in particular, it has not been submitted 
for approval by the Board of Directors.  Any opinions expressed are ours 
and not those of the NBER, the Robert Wood Johnson Foundation, NORC, 
the Hoover Institution, or the Stigler Center.  
 
References: 
Becker, Gary S., and Murphy, Kevin M., “A Simple Theory of Advertising 
as a Good or Bad.”  Quarterly Journal of Economics, 108, No. 4 (November 
1993), 941-964. 
 
Caulkins, Jonathan, P., Estimating the Elasticities of Demand for Cocaine 
and Heroin with Data from 21 Cities from the Drug Use Forecasting (DUF) 
Program, 1987-1991 [Computer file]. ICPSR version.  Santa Monica, CA: 
RAND (Corporation [producer], 1995.  Ann Arbor, MI: Inter-university 
Consortium for Political and Social Research [distributor], 1996. 
  
  34
Coleman, James S., The Adolescent Society.  Free Press. New York: 1961 
 
Grossman, Michael and Chaloupka, Frank J., “The Demand for Cocaine by 
Young Adults: A Rational Addiction Approach,” Journal of Health 
Economics, 17, No. 4, August 1998, 427-474). 
 
Harrison, Paige M. and Beck, Allen J., Prisoners in 2002.  The Bureau of 
Justice Statistics, Washington, D.C.: 2003, P. 10. 
 
MacCoun, Robert and Reuter, Peter, Drug War Heresies: Learning from 
Other Vices, Times and Places (Cambridge, U.K.: Cambridge University 
Press, 2001). 
 
Maguire, Kathleen and Pastore, Ann L., eds. Sourcebook of Criminal Justice 
Statistics. The Bureau of Justice Statistics, Washington, D.C.: 2001, p 515. 
 
Jeffrey A. Miron, “Drug War Crimes”, The Independent Institute, 2004. 
 
Pacula, Rosalie Liccardo, Grossman, Michael, Chaloupka, Frank J., 
O’Malley, Patrick M., Johnston, Lloyd D., and Farrelly, Matthew C. 
“Marijuana and Youth” in Risky Behavior Among Youths: An Economic 
Analysis, edited by Jonathan Gruber, University of Chicago Press, 2000, pp. 
271-326. 
 
Saffer, Henry and Chaloupka, Frank J. “The Demand for Illicit Drugs,” 
Economic Inquiry, 37, No. 3, July 1999, pp. 401-411. 
  
  35
van Ours, Jan C. “The Price Elasticity of Hard Drugs: The Case of Opium in 
the Dutch East Indies, 1923-28” Journal of Political Economy, 103, No. 2, 
April 1995, 261-279. 